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Abstract
Over 60,000 Business Improvement Areas (BIAs)1 exist worldwide. Generally, BIAs 
seek to revitalize their shopping districts, fi nance services, and improve and promote 
their area. Th e fi rst BIA started in Toronto’s Bloor West Village in 1970 and its 
model is now employed worldwide. Despite the global popularity of BIAs, there is 
controversy about what they can achieve. Some boosters argue that BIAs can revitalize 
urban streetscapes and allow small retailers to compete with urban malls. Opponents 
disagree and allege that BIAs are an unnecessary burden on small businesses because 
they achieve few tangible results. Amidst this controversy, this paper analyzes the 
eff ects of longest-running BIA to help resolve some of these questions. After off ering a 
history of the creation of the Bloor West Village BIA, this paper assesses the impact of 
the Bloor West Village BIA over a 35 year period and suggests some of the limitations 
of long-term studies of BIAs.
Keywords: Business Improvement Area (BIA), Bloor West Village, urban revitalization, 
small businesses
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Résumé
Plus de 60 000 zones d’améliorations commerciales (ZACs) existent à travers le monde. 
En général, les ZACs ont pour but de relancer leurs zones commerciales, fi nancer des 
services et améliorer et promouvoir leurs quartiers. La première ZAC a commencé à 
Bloor West Village à Toronto en 1970 et le modèle est maintenant employé autour 
du monde. Malgré leur popularité globale, les ZACs soulèvent de nombreuses 
controverses concernant leurs accomplissements. Certains soutiennent que les ZACs 
peuvent relancer les espaces urbains et permettre aux petites entreprises de rivaliser les 
centres commerciaux. D’autres sont en désaccord et prétendent que les ZACs sont une 
pression fi scale inutile puisqu’elles obtiennent peu de résultats tangibles. Parmi cette 
polémique, il est grand temps de revisiter la première ZAC puisqu’une étude détaillée 
de l’impact de ce ZAC à long terme est possible. Après avoir raconté l’histoire du ZAC 
Bloor West Village, j’examine l’impact historique du ZAC Bloor West Village au cours 
de 35 ans et je suggère quelques limitations des études de ZACs.
Mots clés: Zone d’amélioration commerciale (ZAC), Bloor West Village, réhabilitation 
urbaine, petites entreprises
According to long-time Business Improvement Area (BIA) organizer Bradley Segal, 
BIAs usually function by assessing “property within a defi ned geographic boundary. 
Revenues from this assessment are directed back to the defi ned area to fi nance a 
myriad of services, including security, maintenance, marketing, economic development, 
parking and special events” (2002, 1). A BIA on Toronto’s west side was the fi rst to use 
this model. In the Toronto model, a by-law requires every commercial and industrial 
property within a given boundary to pay a levy, based on the proportionate value of each 
property’s commercial and/or industrial assessment, to the city on behalf of the BIA. 
Th is levy is then returned to the BIA to reinvest back into the retail quarter. In 2014, 
taxes raised by the city on behalf of Toronto’s BIAs totalled over $26 million (calculated 
from Business Improvement Areas—2014 Operating Budgets). BIAs then use these 
funds to promote their areas, improve the façade and streetscape, introduce benches 
and plantings, establish a particular look to attract shoppers and increase the desirability 
of their neighbourhood. Th ey also petition for grants from the city for murals, banners, 
festivals, special events and market research. Fundamentally, BIAs are a legal mechanism 
to raise funds to supplement public services and enhance the appearance of a particular 
place (Houstoun 2003; Hoyt and Gopal-Agge 2007).
At fi rst it seems strange that normally tax-averse businesspeople, such as small 
retailers and shop owners, would voluntarily choose to be assessed an extra tax to 
fi nance a BIA. Yet the global popularity of the movement (the growth of which has been 
documented by Hoyt 2006; Wolf 2006; Gross 2005; Houstoun 2003; Mitchell 2001) 
implies that many business districts see the idea as benefi cial and are willing to invest 
both time and money in the BIA concept. In Toronto, the number of BIAs has risen 
from just one BIA in 1970 to 42 in 2001 and 81 in 2015, which the City of Toronto 
views as a sign of “the success of Toronto’s BIA program” (City of Toronto 2014). Th e 
following paper seeks to determine whether the popularity of the movement is justifi ed 
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by asking if BIAs can achieve the goals they set out to achieve: improving vacancy rates, 
store turnover rates, property values, and the aesthetic of the area, as well as gaining 
governmental and corporate infl uence and increasing the number of shoppers. Using the 
case of the Bloor West Village BIA, the world’s fi rst BIA, it will attempt to determine 
whether BIAs are a form of modern boosterism that achieve few tangible results or are 
a driving force of urban renewal for business districts, as they claim. 
Such a study is particularly timely given that some of the academic literature 
condemns BIAs for being only minimally eff ective (Lloyd et al. 2003) or for ignoring 
certain stakeholders and creating social segregation (see Briff ault 1999; Lavery 1995; 
Ross and Levine 2001) while other studies indicate that the model is successful in many 
diff erent contexts (Gopal-Agge and Hoyt 2007; Birch 2002; Page and Hardyman 1996, 
Ross and Levine 2001). Often, any evaluation of the eff ectiveness of BIAs is diffi  cult 
because so few have established performance indicators. Only 38 percent of Canadian 
BIAs collect this data, while in New Zealand the fi gure is 22 percent. In South Africa, 
89 percent assemble performance data while in the United States just over half of 
Business Improvement Districts gather this data (Hoyt 2005). Even collecting this data 
may not be enough, as there is no agreement as to what aspects to measure and how to 
specifi cally tie this data to the work of BIAs (for two attempts, see Mitchell 2008; and 
Donaghy, Findlay, and Sparks 2013).  Many unanswered questions about the impact of 
BIAs thus remain, and answers to these questions are even more unknown over the long 
term since no long term evaluations of BIAs exist. Th is lack of assessment has caused 
William Mallett (1994, 285) to worry that “some BIAs report successes including[…] 
dramatic improvements in the cleanliness of downtown area,” but it is unclear yet 
whether these programs will have enduring success.2 Others, most notably Th omas J. 
Lueck (1994), argue that BIAs lack accountability for their performance so can make 
claims in favour of their organization without enough public transparency to accurately 
scrutinize their work, which is particularly problematic because BIAs manage “regular 
city streets” (Mallett 1994, 285).
Looking at the case of the Bloor West Village BIA should provide insight into the 
long-term impact of BIAs, since it is the longest running example of the BIA concept 
and broader trends should be discernable in this case. Th is paper thus off ers a historical 
perspective on BIAs through this case study, evaluating some of the long-term eff ects of 
the Bloor West Village BIA, that are not visible in newly formed BIAs. It also suggests 
some of the problems with evaluations of BIAs, even over the long-term. Th is kind of 
historical study has been called for in the literature, with Rachel Meltzer (2010; 511) 
arguing that BIAs “have been in place long enough to produce measurable outcomes.” 
Policy makers, store owners, municipalities and BIAs would also stand to benefi t from 
understanding the eff ects of BIAs on turnover of businesses, neighborhood upgrading, 
and services provided by the municipality over the long term as they implement the BIA 
concept. Th is paper aims to provide analysis of the case of the Bloor West Village BIA 
over a 35 year period.3
Th e Bloor-Jane-Runnymede Shopping District in 1970
Located in the west-end of the City of Toronto, the Bloor West Village BIA was 
the fi rst in the world when it started in 1970. Th e model introduced in the Jane-
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Runnymede-Bloor retail strip was adopted to solve some of the problems facing 
the area. In the late 1960s, the neighbourhood was in decline and businesses were 
struggling. Th e expansion of the Bloor-Danforth subway line in 1966 was just one 
problem facing the area. Before its construction, the shopping district enjoyed end-of-
the-line status and was “a hive of activity” (‘Inside Scoop’ 1995). After its completion, 
shoppers allegedly “sped downtown on the newly opened subway line, or reversed fi eld 
and headed for suburban malls” (Varangu 1984). Th e two shopping centres believed 
to pose the biggest threat to local businesses were the newly developed Cloverdale 
Mall and the soon-to-be-opened Sherway Mall, both to the west (Redmond 1995). 
Th ese malls could entice shoppers with a huge selection of products and services, 
year-round climate-control, and acres of free parking (Bloor West Village BIA 2008). 
Businessmen who took the time to walk down Bloor West saw many ‘For Rent’ signs 
hanging in the windows (Ling 2009). A sample of businesses along Bloor Street West 
in 1960 found that close to 2 percent of businesses were vacant. By 1965, 1.4 percent 
of businesses were vacant, but by the time of the creation of the BIA in 1970, this 
fi gure has risen to 4.1 percent (see Appendix A). In addition to the high vacancy rates, 
shop owners and retailers were concerned with the high turnover rate of stores. Family 
businesses, which had characterized the area for generations, were forced to close. In 
1970, 57 percent of the businesses present in 1960 had been replaced by a diff erent 
store or were vacant (see Appendix B).4 Th ese conditions made it very diffi  cult for 
shops at this time to succeed.
Th e hardships faced by shopkeepers were also exacerbated by a less-than-ideal 
streetscape. Alex Ling, who bought a storefront in the Village in 1971, describes the 
street when he was looking for property as follows:
It was quite diff erent [than it is today]. On the south side there 
was about a half dozen gas stations, almost every corner was 
a gas station, which is not good for business. On the north 
side[…] was a whole block of used-car lots. On the south side 
of Bloor and Jane, where the medical building is now, there was 
the abandoned streetcar turnaround. And everything was just 
dusty and dark. It was horrible! […]Th ere was nothing here 
(Ling 2009).
Neil McLellan, a jeweller who opened his business in the area in 1954, echoes these 
sentiments stating, “the sidewalks were all broken and it looked like all the storefronts 
were about to fall out. My wife and I joke how it used to look like something out of Th e 
Last Picture Show” with broken signs hanging above the dingy and dirty shops that lined 
the almost deserted stretch of Bloor (quoted in Contenta 1984). An “unruly spider’s 
web of overhead wires” also marred any chance of a picturesque streetscape (Varangu 
1984). Construction of the subway line also did not contribute aesthetically to the 
street. Long-time resident, David Hutcheon, recalls, “the whole area was dug up when 
they did the subways[…] a big swath of land[… was] clear cut[…] at the time this was 
not popular” (Hutcheon 2009). Th ese conditions made it diffi  cult for any business to 
survive, let alone thrive. Th e Toronto Star went so far as to report that “Busy Bloor West 
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Village was once a near ghost town” (Contenta 1984). Th e shopping district therefore 
seemed “fated to experience the same graceless decline that in fact befell many other 
undistinguished retail strips” (Varangu 1984). Th e Jane-Runnymede-Bloor area was 
unattractive, faced growing vacancy rates and found it diffi  cult to compete with other 
shopping areas. Retailers certainly felt the pinch.
A Possible Solution to Decline: Th e Bloor-Jane-Runnymede Businessmen’s 
Association
To curtail the downward spiral, the Bloor-Jane-Runnymede Businessmen’s Association 
was formed in the mid-1900s. Th is organization had little success in improving the area 
and drawing shoppers back. Th e association was ineff ective in part because it could 
never rely on a steady stream of funds to make changes. It relied on businesspeople 
from the association devoting “a great deal of their time and eff ort going door-to-door 
soliciting voluntary donations for local improvements and area promotions” (Toronto 
Association of Business Improvement Areas 2007a). In the end, only a few businesses 
were willing to donate. Bill Whiteacre, a key proponent of the formation of the Bloor 
West Village BIA, recalled in an article to Th e Times that “everyone promised to pay 
their dues but only the few heart-and-soulers do” (‘Inside Scoop’ 1995). Cecil Ward, a 
men’s fashion retailer and an early member of the association, agreed when he stated, 
“volunteerism was impossible. Collecting those dues was tough; it was like pulling 
teeth. Th is situation exemplifi ed the ‘free-rider problem.’ And, of course, then you had 
the businesses that refused to pay any dues but were more than willing to take any 
benefi ts” (quoted in Redmond 1995, 8-9). Without a reliable source of income, the 
Businessmen’s Association had diffi  culty obtaining loans to fi nance projects, could not 
invest in long-term development and was unable to make any tangible diff erences. 
A New Solution: Th e Creation of the Bloor West Village BIA
Without change from the Businessmen’s Association, many feared the business 
strip would fade into the prophesied ghost town. A few businesspeople decided 
a new solution was required. In 1969, local jeweller Neil McLellan, area lawyer 
Bill Whiteacre and Bob Bundy of the City of Toronto Parking Authority met in 
a local coff ee shop to discuss a plan. A proposal was outlined “whereby businesses 
would pay an increment, on top of their regular business taxes, to form a fund from 
which the local streetscape would be promoted. Very simple but at the time, very 
innovative” (‘Inside Scoop’ 1995). Th is model would solve the problem of dead-beat 
retailers because the city became the bill collector and penalties for non-payment 
could be instituted (Redmond 1995). Funds would then be given to the Board of 
Managers to revitalize their business strip through physical improvements and 
promotional activities (Toronto Association of Business Improvement Areas 2007a). 
Armed with this innovative plan, the businessmen started to take steps to make their 
concept a reality.
Along the way, there was opposition. Some could not understand why the 
“Bloor West merchants were asking for permission [from Provincial and Municipal 
governments] to pay higher taxes” (‘Inside Scoop’ 1995). Mayor Bill Dennison 
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exclaimed, “Let me get straight[…] are you trying to tell me that these guys want to 
pay more taxes” when Whiteacre went to him with the proposal (quoted in Yang 2010). 
A car dealership in the west refused to support the proposal so the fi nal boundaries 
of the BIA were shortened to exclude it (Yang 2010). In the east, a large supermarket 
also did not endorse the idea, but a visit to their head offi  ce to explain the group’s 
motives won over the executives. Similar visits to every merchant on Bloor Street West 
between Jane and Glendonwynne, persuaded retailers or, at the very least, convinced 
them not to go against the plan even if they did not outright support it. One merchant, 
in the very middle of the retail strip, swore until the fi nal stages that he was opposed 
to the creation of the BIA. He threatened to derail the whole plan by challenging 
the proposal at the Ontario Municipal Board hearing. On the day of the hearing, the 
merchant did not show up to present his case in large part because of the eff orts 
of other merchants. Th is strategy to gain support was particularly important because 
Lawrence Houstoun (2003, 69) has shown that “opposition to proposed BIAs often 
is based on lack of information” which can be solved with “communication with 
economic stakeholders and public offi  cials.” In the case of Bloor West Village, dialogue 
was particularly crucial because there were no prior examples to look to that explained 
how, and if, the concept would work.
With local support, the group behind the BIA concept could begin to alter the 
legal mechanism that prevented the formation of an organization that would be 
altering municipally owned land and which prevented the city from levying funds on 
behalf of this kind of organization. Th e Ontario Municipal Code was soon changed 
and BIA legislation was enacted, becoming section 217 of the Municipal Act. Under 
the New Ontario Municipal Act, enacted in 2003, BIAs came under sections 204-215. 
Th e wording allowed:
A local municipality to designate an area as an improvement 
area and to establish a board of management, to oversee the 
improvement, beautifi cation and maintenance of municipally-
owned land, buildings and structures in the area beyond that 
provided at the expense of the municipality generally; and to 
promote the area as a business or shopping area (quoted in 
Toronto Business Improvement Area Offi  ce 2005, 197).
With this permission from the province, City of Toronto by-law no. 174-70: To 
designate a certain area as an Improvement Area came into eff ect, creating the Bloor 
West Village BIA when it was passed on May 14th, 1970.
Armed with an initial operating budget of $47,500 and representing 275 merchants, 
the newly established BIA had to determine how to solve the problems it intended to 
eradicate (Bloor West Village BIA 2008). Th e BIA board decided to spend most of 
these initial funds on physical improvements to the streetscape, such as fl owerboxes, 
interlocking brick for the sidewalks and fairy-lights for the trees (Harris 1984). Th ese 
improvements were inspired by Sparks Street in Ottawa, which the BIA board had 
visited before submitting their inaugural budget and which was considered to be 
cutting-edge for pedestrian-friendly shopping at the time (Redmond 1995). Even 
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though the beautifi cation project was barely underway when Alex Ling was looking 
for a space where he could relocate his business, he drove through the area and said, 
“Wow, what’s happening! Th e strings of lights on the trees and the fl ower boxes on the 
streets made the area so diff erent than anywhere else” (Ling 2009). Th e early work of 
the BIA had therefore attracted him to start Ling’s Linens and Silk Importers in the 
Village. Others also spoke of the dramatic changes the BIA brought about in its fi rst 
years. Toronto Life, for example, reported that “cheerful lights festooned newly planted 
trees; off -street parking lots disappeared behind discreet hedges or fi eldstone walls; 
bike racks (before their time), fl ower tubs and benches lined the sidewalks” (Varangu 
1984). Th e local paper, Th e Villager, spoke of the “Miracle on Bloor Street West” when 
it gave an account of:
Contractors, working at a furious pace, had installed 100 large 
planters—complete with bright fl owers and young trees— 
along a nine block stretch of Bloor Street. Th e good citizens 
of Swansea and High Park walked out onto a business strip 
that, virtually over night, had been transformed from a rather 
ordinary collection of shops into something special (Th e 
Miracle of Bloor Street West 1985).
A city offi  cial remembered the eff ect that the BIA had on the area, stating “the street 
just blossomed—it was quite dramatic” (quoted in Th e Miracle of Bloor Street West 
1985). Th e physical alterations completed by the BIA transformed the shopping 
district and businesspeople, residents and city offi  cials were starting to take note.
Physical improvements were also coupled with a marketing strategy that devised 
a new name for the area: Bloor West Village. George Rowland, a member of the fi rst 
Board of Directors of the BIA and a local lawyer, had thought of the word ‘village’ to 
describe the area. Th is label evoked nostalgia and intimacy. It created a feel for the 
area—so much so that many neighbourhoods all over Metro copied Bloor West and 
incorporated ‘village’ into their names (Redmond 1995), and many stores also used the 
word “Village” in their businesses’ names. With the improvements to Bloor between 
Jane and Glendonwynne making properties more valuable and recognizing that the 
term ‘village’ conjured up images of friendly and tight knit communities, “real estate 
companys [sic.] tend to trumpet ‘Bloor West Village’ as a location in their advertising— 
although the name is an artifi cial creation” (Th e Miracle of Bloor Street West 1985). 
Toronto Life more satirically appraises the eff ect of the word ‘village’, by stating “Bloor 
West’s thoroughly urban strip masquerades cosily as a village, since its BIA, fi ghting 
the westward drift, had the early wit to call it one” (Epicure 1995). Th e use of the 
term ‘village’ spawned by the BIA helped defi ne the character of the area and became 
a promotional tool for advancing the business district, even if the neighbourhood was 
not properly a village. 
While the beautifi cation projects and the new name for the area were attracting 
attention, not everything was perfect for the BIA and Bloor West Village. Th e 
accomplishments were signifi cant for “a brand new concept[…] which had nothing 
to look to or compare with,” but a lot of small businesses did not want to pay the 
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added taxes because they did not see enough change (Ling 2009). Th ese merchants 
had hoped for long queues in the streets and clients breaking down doors to come in 
to shop. Instead, “people were becoming disenchanted because everybody had to pay 
so much money[…] for all the promotions and beautifi cation projects, so there were 
merchants and lawyers trying to sue the BIA and all these people who had petitions 
[against the BIA]” (Ling 2009). A few boosters and the local paper, Th e Villager, 
enthusiastically supported the BIA model and the beautifi cation projects, festivals 
and marketing campaigns, thereby ensuring that the Bloor West Village BIA survived 
these challenges. Th ese local boosters claimed that BIAs had the ability to improve the 
vitality of the area and promote it as a safe and vibrant place to shop, work, visit, and 
live. But did these claims hold true and had the BIA solved some of the problems that 
had spurred its creation? 
Methodology for Assessing the Bloor West Village BIA’s Impact
Scholars who study BIAs have suggested a number of evaluation metrics for BIAs. 
Mitchell (2008) emphasizes four evaluation categories, including (1) diligence 
(accounting for tasks performed); (2) eff ectiveness (achievement of tangible impacts); 
(3) responsiveness (businesses’ satisfaction with BIA); and (4) sociability (contribution 
to city life). Donaghy, Findlay and Sparks (2013) expand on this framework, but suggest 
that less tangible outcomes should also be included when evaluating BIAs. Th ey add the 
mobilization and creation of social and entrepreneurial capital, the shaping of future 
policy, and public entrepreneurship to Mitchell’s list of evaluation criteria, which they 
then use to evaluate Scottish BIDs (which have been existed since the mid-2000s, as 
Scotland established legislative frameworks for creating BIDs in 2006 and 2007). Th e 
evaluation criteria work well in the Scottish case, since the evaluation data has been 
collected since the BIDs formed and shop owners and patrons usually can provide more 
anecdotal evidence about the eff ects of the BID when other data is not available. In the 
Toronto case, however, these criteria are less feasible: the data simply do not exist or are 
hampered by too many external fl uctuations. Further, over the 35 years that BIAs have 
existed, many shop owners have moved on, making anecdotal evidence of changes that 
result from BIA work diffi  cult to obtain. Th ese challenges speak to the concerns raised 
by these scholars as they attempt to create evaluation criteria; rather than retrospective 
evaluations, they suggest that accounting of BIA accomplishments should be built into 
each BIA from the beginning and not just added as an afterthought. Does this mean, 
though, that it is not possible to evaluate long-running BIAs? 
Given the challenges of evaluating BIAs over the long term, I evaluate the Bloor 
West Village BIA based on the criteria laid out at its founding. While the BIA did not 
formally list outcomes they hoped to achieve, goals permeate the newspaper reports 
and quotations from those involved in the creation of the BIA. I draw on the interviews 
and newspaper reports cited in the historical section of this paper to determine the 
various problems business people hoped the BIA would solve. Adopting this historical 
approach makes the comparison of diff erent BIAs diffi  cult, but it has the advantage 
of evaluating BIAs in their local and historical context. Th is approach has the added 
benefi t of evaluating BIAs using the categories of success that they themselves defi ne.
CJUR winter 24:2 2015 9
BIAs: Th e Case of Bloor West Village
In evaluating the goals business people established when they set up the Bloor 
West Village BIA, seven aims became apparent: vacancy rates, store turn-over rates, 
property values and rising rents, area beautifi cation, marketing, political and corporate 
infl uence, and attracting shoppers. Th e remainder of this paper evaluates the Bloor 
West Village BIA using quantitative and qualitative metrics to examine the BIA’s 
success or failures in each of these categories, as well as the challenges of using these 
criteria.
A. Vacancy Rates
One problem that the BIA thought it could rectify was high vacancy rates. Th ere was 
a belief that, with investments in beautifi cation and promotion, more shoppers would 
be drawn to the area and those already present would not want to leave. Yet during the 
fi rst fi ve years after the BIA’s inception vacancy rates did not decline. In fact rates in 
1975 were 5.2 percent, close to a 1 percent increase from when the BIA was created 
in 1970 (see Appendix A). By 1980 though, vacancy rates were at just 1.6 percent, 
dropping over 4 percent in fi ve years. Th e fact that two of the three vacancies recorded 
in the 1980 community directory came from offi  ces in a newly constructed building 
and that there were now 30 more businesses than there had been 20 years earlier show 
grounds for supporting the proposition that the BIA may have contributed to a turn 
around. New buildings were constructed and could attract businesspeople and the old 
shops were fi lled. By the mid-1990s, there were close to 80 more stores in Bloor West 
Village than there had been in 1960 and the vacancy rate remained relatively constant 
throughout, suggesting support for claims about the BIA’s eff ectiveness at attracting 
shoppers to keep these shops in business.
While there was reason for optimism with the improving vacancy rates in Bloor 
West Village, it is unclear exactly what impact, if any, the BIA had in this change. 
It is diffi  cult to correlate the banners, festivals, photos with Santa, marketing and 
beautifi cation projects carried out by the BIA with improved vacancy rates. Establishing 
a correlation is especially hard given that a number of other factors also infl uence the 
prosperity of an area: larger market forces, competition from other areas, changing 
methods and routes of transportation, shifting demographics, variable shopping trends 
and fl uctuating property values (Houstoun 2003, 145). None of these features remained 
constant for the period considered so it can only be concluded that Bloor West Village 
was a more desirable destination for merchants to establish their businesses, a fact 
which some, correctly or incorrectly, have attributed to the BIA.
B. Store Turnover Rates
Before the BIA was created, businesspeople were disheartened that stores turned over 
at a seemingly rapid rate. Only 43 percent of the stores that existed in 1970 had been 
there ten years earlier. Th e fi gure was practically identical in 1980 with only 40 percent 
of the stores that had been there in 1970 still there ten years later (see Appendix B). 
By the 1991, 49 percent of the business that had been there 11 years earlier remained. 
While the turnover of businesses had been worrisome in the 1960s, in the 1970s 
and 1980s boosters reinterpreted the fi gures so that turnover rates were not seen as 
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quite the problem that they had once seemed (Hutcheon 2009). New stores were 
presented more positively by BIA boosters and shoppers quoted in the local newspaper, 
especially when clothing shops, doctors’ offi  ces and restaurants replaced gas stations. 
What had once been the Donald J. Mackenzie Service Station at 2180 Bloor Street 
West on the corner of Bloor and Glendonwynne, for example, was transformed into 
two restaurants, a hair-dresser’s, a Credit Union, a chiropractic clinic, a food shop and 
a few other miscellaneous businesses.5 Similar changes occurred across the Village, 
with more unsightly businesses replaced by higher scale shops. Some attributed these 
changes to the work of the BIA, although it remains diffi  cult to verify this claim for 
the same reasons that a correlation between the improvements carried out by the BIA 
and decreasing vacancy rates cannot be made with assurance.
C. Property Values and Rising Rents
From 1970 onwards, property values in the Village rose. While rising property values 
might seem positive, Professor of Public Policy and Management, Janet Rothenberg 
Pack (1992), is not so quick to make a connection between raising property values and 
the work of BIAs. She worries that many BIAs make exaggerated claims of their benefi ts 
and that BIAs are “too new to have a track record” (20). Further, to attribute property 
values, either up or down, to BIAs during the 1980s, which were “unusual years, fi rst of 
severe recession, then of vigorous expansion[… as well as considerable infl ation] would 
be foolish” given such turbulence. Given these diffi  culties, a quantitative assessment of 
property values in the Village was not performed.
In the Bloor West Village case, property values may not be a relevant measure 
anyway, since it masks a potential downside to higher property values: higher rents. 
Given that many shopkeepers rented their stores, rent prices may have more of an eff ect 
on the stores in the area than property values. A lease, however, is a private agreement 
between a landlord and a tenant, meaning that actual rental increases are diffi  cult to 
obtain. To surmount this diffi  culty, I turn to newspapers who pointed out that the 
success of the BIA was double-edged because “rents have skyrocketed in recent years 
with some shopkeepers hit with their [rent] doubling and even tripling” (Th e Miracle 
of Bloor Street West 1985) and local businesses owners who claimed that “rents have 
gone up so astronomically that many of the smaller independents… simply can’t aff ord 
rents” (Gadzala 2009). Th e Toronto Star, for example, reported “high real estate prices, 
usually a welcome sign of a neighbourhood’s success, have become a source of angst 
for many of the mom and pop stores in the village” (Williams 1999). Alex Ling, who 
became Chairman of the BIA in 1979, was anxious that “we’ve done too good a job. 
What can you say” about businesses forced to close or who go bankrupt due to high 
property values? (Th e Bloor West Village BIA 1988) While Ling bought his store 
for $51,500—and now thinks it could sell “for a million at least” (Yang 2010)—he 
worried “that we may lose that friendly village touch if some of the smaller businesses 
can’t aff ord the rents” (Th e Miracle of Bloor Street West 1985). Th e BIA’s President 
in 1988, Peter Foltinsky, expressed these concerns more bluntly: “What we’ve done 
is we’ve stabbed ourselves in the back” (quoted in Th e Bloor West Village BIA 1988). 
Reservations about the phenomenal popularity of Bloor West Village that pushed 
rents and property values sky-high appeared in the Toronto Star as early as 1984. But 
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David Hutcheon (2009) made the strongest case for the connection between high 
property values and the BIA when he states:
Bloor West Village was the fi rst BIA in Canada and they created, 
in essence, a main street mall. And so where you had an area 
that was suddenly going through a steep decline from the point 
of view of shopping did not only survive, but it is a success story 
today[…] And the irony of it all is that the pioneers of all this, 
small local businesses, generational businesses in “the village” for 
two, three generations… [have suff ered]. Unfortunately, because 
of their success, those same strong two, three generations stores 
have been pushed out if they didn’t own the property. Th ey 
were pushed out by the McDonalds, the PizzaPizzas, the big 
franchise operators who would come in and pay the larger fee, 
would spend the million dollars to buy the buildings.
Th e BIA possibly helped to raise property values along the shopping district, but the 
rates seemed to have hurt small businesses, many of whom rented their stores. Th e 
BIA does not have control over landlords and rents, despite the belief “among some 
residents that the BIA has… pull when it comes to what moves in and out of the Bloor 
West Village’s main street” (Rainford 2013), so could not directly assist with soaring 
rents. Instead, larger chains (including McDonalds, Starbucks and Second Cup) and 
more upscale shops began to replace smaller businesses in the Village.
D. Beautifi cation Projects
While some criticize the BIA’s infl uence on high rents, many speak positively of the 
beautifi cation projects undertaken by the BIA. Th e owner of Marlborough’s, a fi xture 
in the Village for generations, talks of the “cosmetic improvements that make it a 
pleasant shopping area for clientele” (quoted in Fraser 1985). It appears as though 
beautifi cation projects made the shopping district a more vibrant place, but critics of 
the broader BIA concept argue that BIA-driven branding and uniform street furniture 
can create generic streetscapes that dilute the viability of urban spaces (Caruso and 
Weber 2006). Bloor West Village may have avoided some of these problems given that 
there were no other BIAs undertaking similar projects and the district is fairly small, 
limiting potential homogeneity to nine city blocks.
E. Marketing
Th e BIA’s marketing of the area as a ‘village’ “constantly described as a European 
market-setting” in the local paper and advertisements on radio and in print taken out 
by the BIA was also new after 1970 (Varangu 1984). Alone, a small business would 
never be able to aff ord the fees associated with these marketing strategies, but with the 
BIA it could aff ord to do so. Th e local paper argued that self-promotion “is proving to 
be one of the most eff ective weapons small businesses can deploy in their battle against 
monster malls” (Th e Miracle on Bloor Street West 1985). Th e promotional strategies 
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of the BIA therefore suggest another way that this organization benefi tted the Bloor-
Jane-Runnymede area, and, as Warnaby (2009) describes, BIAs may play important in 
place-making tasks.
F. Political and Corporate Infl uence
Some commentators have also suggested that BIAs are eff ective because of their 
political power. Th ey “bring ‘government’ one step closer to the people, so much so 
that business leaders often call their BIAs rather than their City Council offi  cials for 
solutions to municipal problems” (Garodnick 2000, 1736). Th e BIA can bring issues to 
Council with a united front and will often obtain a resolution of an issue in their favour 
because they are too powerful to be ignored. David Hutcheon (2009), City Councillor 
for Bloor West Village’s Ward in 1994, states:
BIAs were very powerful [and] they became more powerful as 
they became more successful. Th ey’d come to council with their 
issues and council would listen because they were a community 
force. It varies from each group and obviously relationships 
are very important, but the politicians that were interested in 
staying around for a long time would be smart to get in with 
the BIA and the BIAs that wanted to be around for a long time 
would be smart to get in with them because they had mutual 
interests.
BIAs can also apply for grant money and take part in capital-cost sharing projects with 
the city, allowing them to play an important role in ensuring that the city provides for 
its small businesses (BIAs Promote Local Business 2007). 
With the creation of the Toronto Association of Business Improvement Areas 
(TABIA) in 1980, BIAs had even more clout at meetings with all levels of government. 
TABIA worked with provincial and city governments on legislation pertaining to 
small businesses, ensuring that the needs of retail strips would not be ignored (Toronto 
Association of Business Improvement Areas 2007b). Alex Ling helped to form TABIA 
and was its President for 19 years. He speaks fondly of the positive relationship and 
the infl uence of this organization, stating that “every time we had a problem, I was 
always able to get to the city or the province and say ‘let’s have a meeting, get everyone 
together to solve the problem.’ And they always sent people who [were] decision-
makers” rather than having the issues sent back to their supervisors (Ling 2009). In 
fact, one government offi  cial joked to Ling that he needed to get him off  the Board 
of TABIA because he always got what he wanted (Ling 2009). It therefore seems that 
BIAs can be an infl uential group in discussions with various levels of government.
BIAs also seem to be able to infl uence corporations in ways that individual stores 
cannot. For example, TABIA was able to negotiate a special VISA and MasterCard 
rate for the 28,000 businesses it represents. Normally, when a customer charges a 
purchase to their credit card, the bank takes a certain percentage of the sale. Due 
to TABIA’s negotiations, businesses agreed to promote credit cards and the stores 
received as much as a 4.5 to 5 percent discount on these fees, with some stores only 
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losing 2 percent of their credit card sales to the bank (Ling 2009). Essentially then, 
the BIA gave businesses an advantage disproportionate to the size of their business. 
Th e small businesses which characterized Bloor West Village became as infl uential as 
franchises and larger corporations due to the BIA and TABIA. While an association of 
retailers might have been as infl uential, the BIA had the infl uence and funds to carry 
out its demands in ways that a businessmen’s organization might not. 
Levy (2001), Mitchell (2001) and Garodnick (2000) believe that the BIA model 
is a successful one because it generally functions to solve complex municipal problems 
eff ectively and effi  ciently. As the local papers suggested, the case of Bloor West Village 
seems to show just that: “the Bloor Street strip is seen to work, [it is] a happy blend 
of structural boosterism and small-town participation” (Varangu 1984). It is one of 
Toronto’s most popular shopping districts and the BIA is seen as one of the most 
successful of such organizations (Bloor West Village BIA 2002). Exactly how the 
success of busy shopping district is correlated with the work of its BIA remains unclear, 
but it seems that almost everybody has bought into boosters’ ideas that the BIA has 
played a large role in the transformation of Bloor Street West. Th e successes of Bloor 
West Village suggest “there’s no reason to believe [supporters of the BIA] are wrong” 
(Epicure 1995). 
G. Attracting Shoppers
Th e BIA’s work is also believed by some supporters to bring shoppers back into the 
area. Th e Villager argues that, using the model of the Bloor West Village BIA, “more 
than one business district has pulled itself out of a slow slide into oblivion and grabbed 
the loyalty (and dollars) of a grateful public” (Th e Miracle on Bloor Street West 1985). 
Bloor West Village itself has drawn customers back from the suburbs and downtown 
and into the local stores. Th e Kingsway, just over the Humber River to the west, was 
a big draw for the Village’s customers but with the BIA “everything’s been reversed. 
Now the Kingsway does its shopping and eating here [and why would they] not come 
the few blocks east for some of the fi ner things in life?” (Epicure 1995). Th ere was also 
no need for West Torontonians to come “hording down to St. Lawrence [Market] by 
Saturday’s early light [as they used to do]. For them it’s all a fi ve-minute walk away, six 
days a week” (Varangu 1984). It seemed that the BIA had stopped local patrons from 
heading elsewhere for their shopping, but most importantly they were able to bring 
shoppers in from all over the region. Marjorie Harris (1984) argues:
With the streets spruced up, the cafés and shops followed suit. 
Meat markets, delis, bakeries and pastry shops held such an 
abundance of delectable goods that people came from all over 
the city to shop. Th e subway now serves the merchants well. 
For the neighbourhood, they were classy enough to compete 
with anything downtown and a lot more convenient. Business 
boomed.
David Hutcheon (2009) says that “about two-thirds of the people shopping on Bloor 
Street on the weekends are coming from somewhere else. Mississauga is a popular 
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place to come from, [as well as] Etobicoke [and] North York. People who grew up 
in the area come, but also people come because it’s a nice shopping area and they get 
used to some of the stores, some of the speciality stores, and you start to develop an 
affi  nity.” Bloor West Village is therefore a shopping destination in its own right, able 
to compete with other retail areas that had previously drawn customers away.
Conclusion
With beautifi cation and marketing projects, improving property values and vacancy 
rates, increased infl uence over governments and businesses and additional shoppers, 
many attribute Bloor West Village’s prosperity and “remarkable transformation” to the 
BIA (Varangu 1984). However, these proponents’ statements need to be taken with a 
grain of salt. Many are self-professed boosters and major supporters of BIAs. In fact, 
Th e Villager was funded by the BIA so “worked hand in glove promoting the BIA’s 
activities” (Hutcheon 2009). David Hutcheon (2009) also says he’s “been a booster 
and a supporter [of BIAs] since I’ve lived here. I think they do a great job!” and Alex 
Ling also has close to forty years of experience working for BIAs and continues his 
involvement today because he strongly believes that BIAs are the main life-lines of 
business communities (Ling 2009).
Even without the bias of these individuals in favour of BIAs, Janet Rothenberg 
Pack (1992) worries that BIAs, in general, exaggerate their claims of benefi ts, while 
others have shown how diffi  cult it is to eliminate the eff ects of extraneous variables 
that aff ect the impact of BIAs, making it diffi  cult to assess BIAs work (Caruso and 
Weber 2006; Mitchell 2001). Th is study confi rms these diffi  culties. Th e projects 
correlating the BIA’s work to the changes brought about to the retail strip over the 35 
years studied in this paper suggest that long-term studies are not enough to satisfy the 
call in the literature for research projects that concretely examine the eff ects of BIAs 
over the long term, since correlations are even more diffi  cult over longer periods when 
there was, among other factors, greater fi nancial instability, changing market trends, 
greater competition with other BIAs and changes to the transportation infrastructure. 
Comparative studies may help, but it will be diffi  cult to choose retail strips with 
enough similarities to not introduce other variables, especially as many of those studied 
in this project recognized the uniqueness of Bloor West Village. Hutcheon (2009), 
for instance, recognized the strong supporters, the mix of stores and the location as 
important factors in the Village’s success. Th e Villager noted the “years of hard work 
(without pay) by board of management members, a happy mix of cultural backgrounds 
in the neighbourhood stores and services, an energetic local newspaper, the carefully 
cultivated assistance of city offi  cials” (Th e Miracle on Bloor Street West 1985). 
Even if one wished to undertake such a comparative study, data for long-term 
projects is diffi  cult to obtain: the City of Toronto stopped producing City Directories 
in 2001 and stopped recording vacancies by the 2000 Directory, meaning that more 
quantitative data on vacancy rates and turnover rates was not available after this point. 
Assessment roles, phone books and the store directories developed by the BIA were 
not enough to piece this information together. Comparisons of Toronto’s BIAs thus 
must rely on Directory data, so would be rather limited for the 21st century, when many 
of the Toronto’s BIAs formed. In other cities where diff erent data may be kept or for 
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BIAs with better-preserved archival data, it may be possible to fi ll in some of the gaps 
and complete this kind of study, however, the length of time studied will likely be 
much shorter than that of the Bloor West Village BIA, which is currently celebrating 
its 45th birthday. In the meantime, scholars, cities, and BIAs should begin to measure 
some of the eff ects of BIAs in order to more concretely answer questions about the 
eff ectiveness of BIAs.
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Notes
1 Business Improvement Areas are commonly known as Business Improvement 
Districts (BIDs) or Business Improvement Zones (BIZs) outside of Canada. Other 
variations include Special Improvement Districts (SIDs), Public Improvement Districts 
(PIDs), Neighbourhood Improvement Districts (NIDs), Municipal Improvement 
Districts (MIDs) and City Improvement Districts (CIDs) (For a discussion of the 
defi nition, the various structures of BIAs and the naming practices, see Morçöl and 
Zimmermann 2008 and Morçöl and Wolf, 2010; esp. 907).
2 Hutcheon also relates how the Bloor West Village BIA has had to reinvent itself 
a number of times to remain vibrant and ensure success. He also worries that it is 
becoming more diffi  cult for BIAs to make long term gains because so many other 
areas have adopted the same approach.
3 A lack of sources prevented a longer discussion of the role of the Bloor West 
Village BIA; see conclusion for additional discussion.
4 In some cases, the business directory listed a business with a similar name for 
various years. For example, 2253 Bloor Street West was known Peter’s Grill in 1960, 
but listed as Peter’s Restaurant from 1965 onwards. In these cases, it was believed to 
be the same business and not a turnover.
5 Th e business directory between 1960 and 1979 lists the Mackenzie Donald J 
Service Station at 2180 Bloor Street West. By 1980, the property had been divided into 
2180-2190 Bloor Street West and was home to Corsady’s Steak & Hamburger Place 
(2180); Donut Place (2184a); Casablanca Unisex Hair Design (2184b); Buduchnist 
(Toronto) Credit Union Ltd (2184c); High Park Chiropractic & Sports Injury Clinic 
(2184d); Zubkewrych Morris chiropractor (2184d); Sawa Tom chiropractor (2184d); 
Foods For Life (2184e); B & D Jewellery (2186); Adomonis Electronics (2186); 
Fotomat (2190); Cholkan R & Co Ltd general insurance (2190b); Glidden Paint and 
Wallpaper (2190c).
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APPENDIX A
Vacancy Rates in Bloor West Village
Year
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985-
19861
19912 1995
# of Businesses3 156 142 148 134 187 2884 232 238
# of Vacancies5 3 2 6 7 3 6 1 5
% of Vacant 
Businesses
1.9 1.4 4.0 5.2 1.66 2.1 0.4 2.1
Table 1: Vacancy Rates in Bloor West Village from 1960-1995
Notes  
1 No directory was produced for 1985, only one for 1985-1986.
2 Th ere was no City Directory published for Metro West in 1990. 
3 Th e number of businesses is based on a sample which included all the business 
properties on the south side of Bloor Street West within the boundaries of the BIA 
and four of the nine blocks on the north side (from Glendonwynne Road to Durie 
Street) listed within a City Directory. Properties used for purposes other than business, 
such as churches and apartment buildings were omitted. Properties with “No Return” 
or “Not Verifi ed” (as the wording changed to in the 1995 Directory) were also omitted; 
usually less than 2 percent of properties were listed as “No Return,” but in 1991, close 
to 16 percent of properties were listed as “No Return.”
4 Th e number of businesses increased dramatically after the construction of a new 
medical building at 2425 Bloor Street West, the site of an old street car turnaround.
5 Th e number of vacancies is based on the vacancies reported for business properties 
located within the blocks sampled. If a property was originally a business complex, 
but was rezoned to be residential and subsequently went vacant, it was excluded from 
analysis. 
6 One of the reasons that the number of businesses increased in 1980 was that 21 
offi  ces had recently been constructed at 2323 Bloor Street West. Two of the three 
vacancies recorded in 1980 were found in this new complex.
APPENDIX B 
Turnover Rates in Bloor West Village
Year
1970 1980 1991
# of businesses which turned over in 10 Year period 68 69 57
% of businesses which turned over in 10 year period 57 60 51
Table 2: Turnover Rates in Bloor West Village
